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CONFRONTATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CRAWFORD’S BIRTH DID NOT REQUIRE
THAT ROBERTS HAD TO DIE
Robert P. Mosteller*
INTRODUCTION
This essay has changed in basic nature between when it was
first presented at this symposium. It was initially about the
conflict between the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts,1
which provided the basis for Confrontation Clause analysis for
over two decades, and the Clause as seen in the 2004 decision,
Crawford v. Washington.2 I had no doubt that Crawford was
dominant, and virtually no question that Justice Scalia intended
to vanquish Roberts completely.
The issue was whether, as a matter of constitutional criminal
procedure, Roberts “had to die.” My conclusion was that
Roberts was in very good company when one looks at the
general range of modern constitutional criminal procedure
doctrines derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. In particular, I believed that Idaho v. Wright,3
*

Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke Law School. I wish to thank Craig
Bradley, Erwin Chemerinsky, Randy Jonakait, Rick Lempert, Roger Kirst,
Jeff Powell, and Andy Taslitz for their helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this essay. I also wish to thank the participants in the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium for lively debate and helpful insight, and my research
assistant Allison Hester-Haddad.
1
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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which rested on Roberts, contains an important concept worthy
of continued life—unreliable and accusatory hearsay should be
required to pass at least a minimal screening process under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment before it could be
used against a criminal defendant without confrontation. I hoped
that Roberts would be allowed to continue to provide
supplementary protection for nontestimonial hearsay that was
facially problematic and that this essay might in some small way
provide support for Roberts’ continued life within the federal
Confrontation Clause. The preceding paragraph is written
largely in the past tense. This is because as I was completing the
editing of this essay, the Supreme Court decided Whorton v.
Bockting,4 which states in unmistakable terms that Roberts is
dead and that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
has no role in excluding unreliable hearsay that is
nontestimonial.5
When I read the Bockting opinion, it brought to mind a story
from my first year at Yale Law School. A friend there, let me
call him Dave, had many interests outside of legal studies. As
we approached our first semester exams, some classmates
worried that Dave had not spent the necessary hours studying.
He entered one particularly difficult exam, and to everyone’s
amazement, he almost immediately began writing on the very
lengthy and difficult single question that comprised the exam.
He later told us he began writing quickly in order to avoid
panic. Unfortunately for Dave, deep into the exam, he learned
of the death of the party around whom he had structured his
exam answer. Judging correctly that it was too late to start over,
Dave tore a page from his bluebook, wrote on it “had X not
died,” placed that piece of paper in the front of his bluebook,
and kept writing. There was nothing else that could be done.
Fortunately, Yale’s first semester exams are pass/fail, and Dave
passed. He has gone on to be a very successful attorney. I now
figuratively insert that bluebook page, and suggest that readers
examine this essay as they would “had Roberts not died.”
4
5

127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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After the strong suggestion in Davis of Roberts’ demise, I
did not entirely understand the apparent happiness of liberal
leaning academics. I believe Roberts’ death should be mourned
rather than celebrated. The end of such supplemental protection
under the federal Constitution is unfortunate, and it makes this
essay in many ways an “academic” exercise, which it
presumably will be during my lifetime with regard to the federal
Constitution. I nevertheless recommend this essay and what is
now a thought experiment to readers as part of Roberts’ decent
burial. Moreover, the arguments presented here are not
irrelevant. State supreme courts have the power to preserve
Roberts-type protection under their states’ confrontation clauses,
which need not move in lockstep with the United States Supreme
Court, particularly when that Court goes beyond the clarity of
historical sources and ignores important values. Additionally,
now that the Supreme Court has stated that unreliability is not a
direct concern of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
as matters of policy, the legislatures can and should structure
statutory protections to guard against unreliable nontestimonial
hearsay.
The basic Crawford approach, whether or not precisely
correct in formulation,6 remedies an inadequacy in constitutional
protection of the core confrontation right. Accordingly, I do not
disagree with the proposition that Crawford is roughly “right.”
However, I do not accept that Roberts was all wrong in
providing lesser supplementary protection outside the core
concerns embodied in the testimonial concept. Given the obvious
and widely recognized inadequacy of Roberts’ protection for the
confrontation right, one might wonder why—or whether—the
decision would have been worth preserving.7 I was in fact most
6

See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Softening of the Formality and
Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV.
429 (2007) (discussing some of the advances of Davis against the possibility
of an extremely formal and formalistic definition but also noting some of the
remaining problems with even a “softened” definition anchored in formality).
7
I am not alone in finding value in its residual protections. See Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis, and Bockting,
19 REGENT U. L. REV. 367 (2007) (arguing the multiple ways that Roberts
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concerned with preserving Wright, which has not been officially
interred, but likely has no future under Crawford.8
In Wright, the court excluded highly problematic statements
by a child that were accusatory and secured by leading questions
asked by a pediatrician, rather than a police officer, as violating
the Confrontation Clause under Roberts. Situations analogous to
that in Wright, whether or not declared to involve testimonial
statements, should but are not likely to be scrutinized under the
Confrontation Clause.9 Hopefully, such scrutiny (or some
has constrained receipt of problematic hearsay and the unfortunate
consequences of its total demise).
8
Of course, it is not possible to know if Wright will be preserved by the
Supreme Court, but its future is realistically bleak. Its focus is the
unreliability of the out-of-court statement, which Bockting excludes from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 127 S. Ct. at 1183. Ominously, Scalia had
not cited Wright at all in either Crawford or Davis, although he cited many
other recent cases which he endorses in result if not in approach. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 58-60. Moreover, the case does not exhibit the types of features
that clearly brings it within the testimonial concept (questioning by a police
officer), and the private status of the doctor who received the statement and
the arguable primary purpose of his questioning of the child—to conduct a
medical examination—would support treating it as nontestimonial. See
generally Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J.
919 (2007) (examining the developing consensus among the lower courts to
include some statements by children, such as those to police officers, within
the testimonial concept and to exclude others, such as those to doctors, and
the potential decisive impact of Davis’ focus on the questioner’s “primary
purpose” in resolving the treatment of children’s statements).
9
If one had the power to move the Supreme Court toward revision of
Roberts as a true supplemental protection outside the core defined by
testimonial statements, rather than its preservation to offer protection against
highly problematic accusatory hearsay, I might try to reformulate Roberts’
dimensions to redefine its relationship to hearsay exceptions, for example,
and give review under it somewhat more rigor. My sense, however, is that
mere preservation without reform will be difficult enough, if not impossible.
I choose here take on one largely hopeless task at a time. Perhaps the
testimonial statement concept will be developed in future cases to be broad
enough that many of my concerns about problematic, typically highly
accusatory hearsay, will be met directly because these problematic statements
will be defined as testimonial. Despite the largely positive direction of Davis
in softening the testimonial statement concept in terms of its formality and
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scrutiny) will continue in some courts and through other legal
mechanisms.
Part I and Part II of this essay compare the approaches set
forth in Crawford and Roberts. I accept that Crawford’s core
concept may be anchored firmly in constitutional history,10 but
that did not necessarily render Roberts wrongheaded or an unfit
constitutional outlier. Of course, originalism dictates that
Roberts (and likely Wright) must die, but that is equally true of
much of the rest of modern constitutional criminal procedure
based on the Bill of Rights. In Part III, I examine the story of
Sir Walter Raleigh, certain aspects of which the Court relied
upon in Crawford to establish the new Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. However, the Court in that case conveniently
omitted other problematic hearsay introduced against Raleigh
history, which lends support to a somewhat broader
confrontation right.11 Part IV describes the difficulties
formalism, which unfortunately may be almost inherent in a definition built
around the testimonial concept, I fear a confrontation jurisprudence that
covers exclusively testimonial statements will be inadequate. See generally
Mosteller, supra note 6 (noting the positive movement of Davis but the
uncertainty of the future course of the definition given the continued
commitment to formality as a necessary element and the difficulty of
providing appropriately broad coverage of problematic accusatory hearsay
while remaining at all true to the word “testimonial”).
10
Although the detail of the Framers’ primary concern is at best difficult
to pin down and more likely impossible to determine, I believe that at a
somewhat broader level it is clear that the Confrontation Clause was written
as part of the effort to reject the inquisitorial model of trial and accordingly
that it firmly rejected ex parte examinations that were part of the civil-law
mode of criminal procedure. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. That leads to
exclusion of “testimonial statements” in their narrow definition, but would
also extend to other areas, such as accusatorial statements that might provide
a more useful shorthand. See Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the
Formalistic Definition—the Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST.
14 (Summer 2005). See generally infra note 94.
11
In Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), Justice Scalia
focused on one isolated part of the Raleigh story as proof by itself of the
Framers’ intent:
The Framers were no more willing to exempt from crossexamination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended
questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed
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confronted in the process of translation that is inherent in the
originalist approach, and proposes ways of negotiating this
process.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CRAWFORD
AND ROBERTS APPROACHES
Crawford’s transformation of confrontation analysis from a
broad but weak reliability based system to a regime that offers
far more powerful protection for the narrow class of testimonial
statements was a stunning development. I begin by describing
the new system and then set out and critique the old
methodology.
A. The Crawford Approach
In Crawford, the Supreme Court created a new paradigm for
Confrontation Clause analysis with regard to the admission of
out-of-court statements. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
the Court applied the Clause with real rigor to a subset of such
out-of-court statements, which it termed “testimonial”
statements. Relying on history, dictionary definitions, and his
own brand of originalism, Scalia found support for a focus on
such statements in the use of the word “witnesses” in the text of
the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the accused in a
criminal case the right “to be confronted with the witnesses

interrogation. (Part of the evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh
was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of
sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How St. Tr. 1, 27
(1603)).
Id. at 2274 n.1. Surely the Cobham letter is part of the Raleigh story, but we
have no indication that the Framers thought it particularly significant and
certainly no indication that the words of the Constitution are designed to
cover volunteered statements because of the injustice of receiving such
evidence. Scalia has no more evidence that the Cobham letter should define
the right than admission of the hearsay accusation from the Portugese
gentleman, see infra Part IV, which is nontestimonial under his terminology
and which he conveniently completely ignores.
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against him.”12
Justice Scalia observed that history reflected a special
concern by the Framers for the use of statements that were of a
“testimonial” character: “[T]he principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.”13 He cited two
specific examples: first, the use of statements taken from
accusers by the examining magistrates under the Marian Statutes
in the sixteenth century,14 and second, the accusations of Lord
Cobham against Sir Walter Raleigh in his treason trial, who had
implicated him in both an examination before the Privy Council
and in a letter to it.15
With respect to the dictionary and its insight into the
meaning of the constitutional language, Justice Scalia wrote:
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this
focus. It applies to “witnesses” against the accused—
in other words, those who “bear testimony.”
“Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
12

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
14
Id. at 44, 50.
15
Justice Scalia states that Cobham “had implicated [Raleigh] in an
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at
44. Cobham’s accusation was obtained through interrogations in the Privy
Council on three different occasions. 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS
410 n.† (1832) (indicating interrogations on July 16, 19, and 20, 1603).
Cobham wrote two letters to the Council, which were read at Raleigh’s trial.
One letter was dated July 29, 1603, which was written after his examination
on July 20, and was used to “fortify the Lord Cobham’s accusation against”
Raleigh. Id. at 422-23. The second, a much more damning letter that
implicated Raleigh directly, was written in November during the trial. Id. at
444-46. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington, Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 545
(2005). Again in Davis, Scalia refers to only one letter, stating “[p]art of the
evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was
plainly not the result of sustained questioning.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274
(citing Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603)). The letter described in
his cited source is the latter of the two, which directly accuses Raleigh.
13
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establishing or proving some fact.” An accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.16
From these sources and his originalist perspective, Scalia
adopted the testimonial statement approach. He left for another
day a comprehensive definition of such statements, stating that
“it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations.”17
The Court slightly amplified the coverage of testimonial
statements in Davis v. Washington.18 The Court stated that:
Statements are not testimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.19
16

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
17
Id. at 68.
18
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
19
Id. at 2273-74. In the formulation of the test in Davis, Scalia appears
to perform several subtle alterations in his test from the text of Webster’s
dictionary on which he bases the test. First, he shifts from an apparent focus
on the intent of the speaker (“made for the purpose of establishing or
proving”) to that of the police who solicited the statement (“primary purpose
of the interrogation”), and he de-emphasized the importance of the formality
of the statement (“a solemn declaration or affirmation”) by applying it to an
oral statement made in the field to a police officer that Justice Thomas, in
dissent, believed deviated from the historical examples exemplified by the
formality of proceedings before the examining magistrates under the Marian
Statutes. Id. at 2280-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Mosteller, supra note
6, at 447-49; Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana: Beating Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 7-9
(2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/mosteller.

MOSTELLER.DOC

9/4/2007 10:41 PM

CONFRONTATION AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

693

Crawford set out strict standards for dealing with testimonial
statements and stated that in order to admit such statements
without confrontation, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”20 While the goal of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure reliability, it protects as “a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence is
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”21 Thus, unless a
testimonial statement fits into one of a limited number of
exceptions,22 it must be excluded unless the declarant is
unavailable and the statement was subjected to earlier
confrontation, or the declarant is brought into the courtroom and
is subject to cross-examination.
B. The Roberts Approach
Roberts also begins with the words of the Sixth Amendment,
but reflects a facially far broader notion of the phrase “witnesses
against him” than Scalia’s interpretation of the phrase in
Crawford. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court stated: “If
one were to read this language literally, it would require, on
objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant
not at trial.”23 He concluded that, although the Clause “was
pdf.
20

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 61.
22
Among these limited exceptions are that the statement is not used for
its truth, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S.
409, 414 (1985)), and that the defendant forfeited his right to confrontation
by wrongdoing, id. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
158-59 (1979)), the latter of which the Court seemed in Davis to encourage
domestic abuse prosecutors to use. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. For the other
exceptions, see 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252, at 163-64 (6th ed. 2006).
23
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). I do not consider in my
treatment of the issue the excellent research and arguments by Professor
Randy Jonakait that Scalia’s use of the definition offered by Webster for the
word testimonial is selective and that an equally reasonable definition would
have covered all hearsay statements as Roberts did. See Randolph N.
21
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intended to exclude some hearsay,” an approach that excluded
virtually every hearsay statement was inconsistent with historical
practice and had been rejected “as unintended and too
extreme.”24 Instead, Roberts recognized that the case law had
established a set of principles that reflected a compromise
between competing interests: on the one hand, a preference for
face-to-face confrontation, the right to cross-examination, and a
concern for accuracy and integrity in the fact-finding process,
and on the other, concerns of public policy and necessity
reflected by the need for effective law enforcement and the clear
formulation of evidentiary rules and procedures.25
Roberts found that the Confrontation Clause imposes two
types of requirements.26 First, the Framers’ preference for faceto-face accusation translated into a requirement that the
prosecution either produce the declarant or demonstrate his or
her unavailability.27 Later cases concluded that this was not in
fact a general requirement, but applied only to a limited class of
hearsay statements and most clearly only to prior testimony.28
The second requirement, trustworthiness, proved the more
lasting and fundamental element of the system. Where
Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington,
Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 198 (2006).
Although quite plausible in my judgment, Professor Jonakait’s message is a
bit more sweeping than my effort simply to say Roberts is within the fold of
many contemporary criminal procedure protections and should not be rejected
because of its failure to meet Scalia’s exacting, and I believe, contestable
standards.
24
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
25
Id. at 63-64.
26
See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 159.
27
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
28
In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986), the Court held
that unavailability need not be shown for coconspirator statements because
they have “independent evidentiary significance” that made them superior to
what could be obtained if the declarant testified at trial. In White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992), the Court applied that rationale to statements
admitted under the excited utterance and “medical examination” exception,
and effectively generalized the elimination of the unavailability requirement to
a large group of hearsay exceptions, including all those in Rule 803 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 160.
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unavailability is shown and no confrontation is provided,
Roberts looked to the underlying purpose of the Clause “to
augment accuracy in the fact finding process by ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.”29 The
statement could be introduced if the hearsay was “marked with
such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule.’”30 Justice Blackmun’s opinion
argued that “certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”31
Hearsay could be introduced without confrontation if judged to
be trustworthy because that judgment was seen as making crossexamination unnecessary.
The opinion’s reliability test was formulated as follows:
“Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”32
C. Critique of Roberts
Leaving aside for a moment Crawford’s scorn for Roberts,33
the Roberts system of confrontation analysis is rather easily
criticized on a number of levels. In terms of its effectiveness as
protection for defendants either to enforce a guarantee of
confrontation, which I suggest should be the primary goal of the
Clause,34 or to exclude unreliable hearsay in the absence of
confrontation, which is a necessary remedy for violation and an
inducement to providing confrontation, it was largely a failure.
While in theory the confrontation right under Roberts provided
broad coverage, it often resulted in scant protection as a
29

448 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 65 (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
31
Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
32
Id. at 66.
33
See infra, notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
34
See generally Mosteller, supra note 6.
30
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practical matter.35
For hearsay other than prior testimony, the rights of face-toface confrontation and cross-examination were easily ignored
when faced with hearsay other than prior testimony. Roberts and
its progeny allowed the prosecution to admit most hearsay that
fell within established hearsay exceptions without any effort to
produce even readily available declarants.36 It required
absolutely no showing of trustworthiness for statements admitted
under the long list of established hearsay exceptions that Roberts
itself colorfully lampooned as “‘an old-fashioned crazy quilt
made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists,
futurists and surrealists,’”37 and allowed ad hoc balancing for
the scrutinized statements that fell within non-traditional
exceptions or problematic expansions of traditional exceptions.
Only occasionally did Roberts provide protection even
against facially problematic hearsay. The Supreme Court
excluded hearsay in several cases involving accusatory
statements by co-defendants under police interrogation admitted
as statements against interest,38 and in Wright,39 the Court
excluded highly accusatory statements secured by leading
questions from a child witness/victim, which in the lower courts
had been admitted under Idaho’s catch-all exception.
Crawford described Roberts’ departure from historical
principles as twofold. First, Roberts was too broad in that it
applied to hearsay that was not ex parte testimony and thus was
“far removed from the core concern of the clause;” it was also
35

See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 6 (describing briefly the weaknesses of
Roberts and comparing it to the more vigorous protections provided by
Crawford for an important group of problematic hearsay statements, but
considering Roberts “better than nothing” and occasionally offering protection
from problematic hearsay).
36
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 159-60.
37
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John M.
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV.
909, 921 (1937)).
38
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530 (1986).
39
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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too narrow in that it often admitted ex parte testimony under a
malleable reliability standard, which “often fail[ed] to protect
against paradigmatic confrontation violations.”40 Crawford
repeatedly criticized Roberts as effectively standardless, stating
accurately, for example, that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if
not entirely subjective, concept.”41 Second, and more damning,
was Roberts’ admission of “core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude,” referring here
to accusatory statements made by a co-defendant under police
interrogation, which the Court in Lilly v. Virginia42 had earlier
indicated was highly problematic.43 This failure is truly damning
for Roberts as a primary test for guaranteeing confrontation.
Later in the term, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,44
Scalia returned to a criticism of Roberts’ “functional” approach
in a case concerning another aspect of the Sixth Amendment—
whether denial of a defendant’s right to appointed counsel of his
choice was subject to harmless error analysis if it did not
undermine the fairness of the trial. He stated:
What the Government urges upon us here is what was
urged upon us (successfully, at one time . . .) with
regard to the Sixth Amendment’s right of
confrontation—a line of reasoning that “abstracts
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the
right.”45
40

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 63.
42
527 U.S. 116 (1999) (ruling that admission of non-testifying
accomplice’s confession violated confrontation right under Roberts).
43
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (observing that despite the Lilly plurality’s
suggestion that accomplice confessions could not survive under Roberts
analysis, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137, courts continued to routinely admit such
statements). The Court cited a study by Roger Kirst that accomplice
statements were admitted more than one-third of the time in the seventy-five
cases he examined. Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the
Confrontation Question in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 104-05
(2003).
44
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
45
Id. at 2562 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
41
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As noted above, Scalia’s opinion in Crawford indicated clear
displeasure with Roberts, and he raised the issue of its survival
by first observing that the analysis in Crawford had cast doubt
on the decision in White v. Illinois,46 inter alia, not to limit the
Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements. However, he
avoided resolution of the issue because the Court was not
required to decide its survival as to nontestimonial statements in
order to rule that a new system applied to testimonial statements
such as those in Crawford.47 Near the end of his opinion in
Crawford, Scalia allowed that as to nontestimonial hearsay, “it
is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does
Roberts.”48 But again he raised the specter of total obliteration,
noting that “an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether would also provide
such flexibility.”49
The continued viability of Roberts was not directly at issue
in the consolidated cases of Davis and Hammon, the Supreme
Court’s second decision under its new paradigm, because
admission of the statements in Davis and Hammon did not turn
on Roberts’ application. The statements in Hammon were
excluded because they were found to be testimonial, despite
Roberts’ acceptance of those statements.
The situation in Hammon was precisely the same as in
Crawford, where the Court effectively overruled Roberts as to
statements in the core area of confrontation concern, but left it
unaffected outside that core.50 In Davis, other statements were
ruled admissible under the Confrontation Clause because they
were considered nontestimonial. Roberts would likewise have
admitted those statements because they fit within a firmly rooted
hearsay rule—excited utterances.51 Thus, under both Crawford
46

502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992).
541 U.S. at 61.
48
Id. at 68.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 61, 68.
51
In its opinion in State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), the
Supreme Court of Washington noted that “[r]elying on Ohio v. Roberts . . . ,
47

MOSTELLER.DOC

9/4/2007 10:41 PM

CONFRONTATION AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

699

and Roberts the results would have been identical to that in
Davis, and no occasion would arise to rule on the continued
validity of Roberts.
Nevertheless, again in an opinion by Scalia, the Davis Court
signaled its displeasure with Roberts and announced its demise,
albeit somewhat obscurely. The opinion stated: “It is the
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other
hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”52 Also,
referring to its focus on testimonial hearsay in Crawford, it
stated: “A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the
constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not
merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”53 Thus, in dicta, Davis laid
Roberts to rest and declared the Confrontation Clause
inapplicable to hearsay that is not testimonial. Although I
recognized that even dicta can sound the death knell of a
previous holding, I hoped it was more than an “academic”
exercise to argue for its survival.54
the Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly classified the 911 call
as an excited utterance, which is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule
and thus satisfies the requirements of reliability.” Id. at 847. Davis did not
challenge the correctness of the determination that the Confrontation Clause
had not been violated in Roberts. See Brief for the Petitioner, Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224) (citing Roberts at three
points but not relying on it in any fashion to support reversal of the
conviction).
52
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
53
Id. at 2274.
54
Although Scalia’s statements about Roberts’ demise were arguably
clear, the early decisions by lower courts were not uniform after Davis and
prior to Bockting. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir.
2006), State v. Davis, 148 P.3d 510, 515-16 (Kan. 2006), and State v. Blue,
717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006), state that Roberts continues to apply to
nontestimonial statements. However, United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660,
665 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006), which was decided by the same circuit as Thomas
shortly after it, noted that Davis “appears to have resolved the issue, holding
that nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to the Confrontation Clause” but
found it unnecessary to address the issue because there was no dispute that if
the statements were nontestimonial the Clause was not violated, and United
States v. Felix, 467 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2006), ruled that Davis made it
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Whorton v. Bockting55 unmistakably buries Roberts and
makes its destruction and the elimination of any supplemental
protection to nontestimonial hearsay part of the reasoning of the
case, which cannot be characterized as dicta. Bockting
repeatedly states, without limitation, that Crawford overruled
Roberts.56 However, the most telling and significant portion of
the opinion explains why Crawford does not implicate the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial and therefore
should not be considered a “watershed rule” that would make it
retroactive.
The Court stated:
With respect to testimonial out-of-court statements,
Crawford is more restrictive than was Roberts, and
this may improve the accuracy of fact-finding in some
criminal cases. Specifically, under Roberts, there may
have been cases in which courts erroneously
determined that testimonial statements were
reliable. . . . But whatever improvement in reliability
Crawford produced in this respect must be considered
together with Crawford’s elimination of Confrontation
Clause protection against the admission of unreliable
out-of-court
nontestimonial
statements.
Under
Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not
subject to prior cross-examination could not be
admitted without a judicial determination regarding
reliability. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the
clear that confrontation only applied to testimonial statements. See generally
James J. Duane, The Crypotographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts,
21 CRIM. JUST. 37 (Fall 2006) (describing correctly the demise of Roberts
albeit by cryptic statements in Davis). Whether the justices who joined
Scalia’s opinion recognized fully the import of his language, and more
importantly, whether they appreciated the implications of that statement for a
case like Wright is a matter of some uncertainty. I recognize these are thin
reeds on which to depend, but they provide some possibilities for the future.
55
127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
56
Id. at 1179, 1182-83. These statements seem plainly inaccurate as to
nontestimonial statements. In Crawford, the Court stated on that issue that
“we need not definitively resolve whether it survives our decision today.”
541 U.S. at 61.
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Confrontation Clause has no application to such
statements and therefore permits their admission even
if they lack indicia of reliability.57
Thus, Bockting frees nontestimonial hearsay from scrutiny
under the federal Confrontation Clause and lays Roberts to rest.
Now, I turn to either what might have been “had Roberts not
died” and to an examination of what state supreme courts and
legislatures should consider in examining the constitutional and
statutory protects against unreliable hearsay.
II. TWO-PART CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION—GREATER
PROTECTION FOR THE CORE RIGHT AND LESSER PROTECTION FOR
A FUNCTIONALLY RELATED PROBLEM
Constitutional criminal procedure recognizes doctrines under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments that principally protect
individual from violations by the government of core
constitutional rights.58 Although inconsistent with strictly
originalist interpretations and hardly elegant, the Court in the
second half of the twentieth century, particularly during the
Warren Court era, expanded these doctrines to protect additional
areas outside of but related to the core concern.59 In these latter
57

Whorton, 127 S. Ct. at 1183 (emphasis added).
These core rights include the protection of the home against searches
in the absence of probable cause and a warrant under the Fourth Amendment,
protection of a suspect against being forced under penalty of contempt to
testify in court against herself under the Fifth Amendment, and the holding of
secret trials under the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend IV, V & VI.
59
As I have read e-mails from my colleagues in evidence scholarship, I
have been struck by how many of them with liberal political and doctrinal
leanings seem to embrace with some enthusiasm Justice Scalia’s originalism
as exhibited in Crawford and Davis. My reaction is different, which I
attribute to the fact that I am also anchored in criminal procedure, and see the
potentially quite negative impact of this mode of reasoning on the broad set
of criminal procedure rights that were created during the Warren Court
revolution and are largely treated as part of accepted law today.
I attribute at least part of this difference between my reaction and what I
perceive as that of a larger number who appear to welcome Roberts’ demise
to the fact that within constitutional criminal procedure and even within the
58
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situations, something of a functional approach was often used in
fashioning the dimensions of the expanded modern right,60
sometimes resulting in a somewhat lower degree of protection
outside the core right.61
A strong Crawford-based analysis protecting the core and a
weaker Roberts-based analysis protecting a broader area would
Sixth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause is studied most carefully by
evidence scholars rather than criminal procedure scholars. This anomaly has
been attributed to Dean Henry Wigmore’s impact on the Confrontation
Clause and his capture of that area of constitutional law by evidence scholars.
See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of
Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332-43 (1981). As many scholars have
noted, this is but one of the consequences of Wigmore’s influence in this
area, which equated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay doctrine and was
effectively adopted in Roberts. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking
Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 713 (1993). Professor
Randy Jonakait has made arguments that flow from at least a related
intuition. He has linked the Confrontation Clause within the Sixth
Amendment to other criminal procedure rights both as a matter of history and
of construction. See Jonakait, supra note 23; Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 77 (1995); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to
the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988).
The effort to fit Confrontation Clause jurisprudence into a larger pattern
of constitutional criminal procedure clearly has its difficulties and much
complicates the story. My contention here is somewhat narrower, however. I
believe as evidence scholars, we operate at some peril if we embrace
originalism in the area of confrontation without recognizing its broader
implications and potential impact on other constitutional rights or if we
examine the Confrontation Clause totally in isolation from larger theories of
constitutional law and constitutional criminal procedure.
60
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (abandoning the
trespass and property law basis of the Fourth Amendment previously
employed and protecting conversation in telephone booth, the Court
recognized the importance of the public telephone in private communication).
61
Compare New Jersey v. Portash, 450 U.S. 385 (1978) (ruling that as
to statements obtained in a pure violation of the Fifth Amendment through
formal compulsion, impeachment was not permitted) with Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting impeachment with statements obtained
in violation of the expanded right under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
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differ principally from the development of other criminal
procedure doctrines in the chronological order of when the core
and the secondary rights were recognized. The normal pattern is
for the core right to be recognized relatively early and to enjoy
continued protection into the modern era. Additional rights are
extrapolated from the core right at a later time, and often
justified as an application of the original intention to the changed
circumstances of modern life.62 Confrontation Clause protection,
by contrast, has involved a reversal of the temporal development
of the otherwise familiar two-part pattern, and perhaps it is this
distinction that gives Crawford its special attraction for some
who see it as the only appropriate protection.
Before 2004, there was a good argument to be made that the
Confrontation Clause under Roberts provided less protection to
the areas with which the Framers were particularly concerned.
While the protection was broader than the Framers had
envisioned, that was not remarkable in the context of other
modern rights. More unusual was that the strong protection the
Framers intended to provide to areas of core concern was not
effectively guaranteed by the Warren Court or under the Roberts
decision, and it was not until very recently in Crawford that the
Court first provided such strong protection. Such a failure of
core protection is atypical, and in its attractive affirmative
holding Crawford accomplished the restoration of a
constitutional commitment to guarantee confrontation. Thus,
Crawford is “right” to that extent. Its suggested destruction of
Roberts, however, was of a different character. An originalist
perspective would call for such a destruction, but no more so
than for most other expansions of rights in modern criminal
procedure, such as Miranda,63 which have not been obliterated.

62

See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1165 (1993).
63
384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra note 64 and accompanying text, see
also infra notes 66-95 and accompanying text.
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A. The Primacy of Constitutional Commitments to Prohibit
Conduct in Original Intent
In his book on the structure of constitutional law, Professor
Jed Rubenfeld64 provides a way to visualize this dichotomy
between that which is clearly on solid constitutional grounds and
that which is ahistoric but hardly uncommon or unjustifiable as a
matter of constitutional interpretation, suggesting an “impossibly
simple distinction:”
Specific understandings about a constitutional right
can take two different forms: There can be specific
laws or practices that the right is understood to
prohibit; and there can be specific laws or practices
that the right is understood not to prohibit. Virtually
all the important historical understandings of the
former kind—specific understandings of what a right
prohibited—are
alive
and
well
throughout
constitutional law, playing a foundational role in the
doctrine. By contrast, where constitutional doctrine
has
departed
from
important
historical
understandings, it has virtually always departed from
understandings of the latter kind—concerning what a
right did not prohibit.65
Professor Rubenfeld labels constitutional understandings
about what constitutional rights are understood to prohibit as
“Application Understandings,” and he labels the historical
understanding of what the rights did not prohibit as “NoApplication Understandings.”66 He sees originalism as treating
all understandings as equally binding, but flawed for that very
reason.67 Application Understandings are foundational or core
64

JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). In his review of this book, my
colleague Jeff Powell finds Rubenfeld’s bold claims about his new method of
constitutional interpretation quite successful. H. Jefferson Powell, Grand
Visions in an Age of Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2067, 2085-92 (2006).
65
See RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 13.
66
Id. at 14.
67
Id. at 15.
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understandings.68 They are fundamental commitments that are
not to be disregarded, and Rubenfeld believes the pattern of
cases show they indeed have rarely been disregarded.69 NoApplication Understandings are not “commitments” but are
rather “intentions,” which can and have been disregarded.70
Rubenfeld sees judges building frameworks around the
paradigmatic Applications Understanding, and in that process
occasionally
breaking
free
from
No-Application
Understandings.71
B. Examples of the Dichotomy in Faithfulness to Historical
Practices in Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Rubenfeld looks briefly at contemporary constitutional
criminal procedures, which he characterizes correctly as
“notoriously untethered to original understandings or
practices.”72 In this field, the Supreme Court dramatically
expanded constitutional guarantees governing police procedure
regarding searches, arrests, and questioning far beyond the
original understanding, while leaving foundational applications
intact to play a central role in development of the doctrine.73
As to the Fourth Amendment, the clearest historical view is
that the amendment was intended to prohibit “general warrants,”
which is an Application Understanding. That Understanding
remains a basis for invalidating insufficiently particularized

68

Id. at 14. The discussion in the text concerns provisions that prohibit,
which is the nature of most of the Bill of Rights provisions. As to
constitutional provisions that grant power, Application Understandings are the
inverse—they are understandings of what that provision authorized. NoApplication Understandings in this context are understandings of what the
constitutional provision did not authorize. Id.
69
He recognizes only two areas of possible counterexamples, both
having to do with “powers” rather than rights. One involves the contracts
clause and the other the declaration-of-war clause. Id. at 67-68.
70
RUBENFELD, supra note 66, at 14-15.
71
Id. at 16.
72
Id. at 32.
73
Id.
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warrants.74 According to Rubenfeld, it also provided the general
source for expansion into areas not covered at the time of the
framing through a general principle derived from it: “that the
Fourth Amendment stands against unconstrained police
discretion and unjustified intrusions into personal privacy.”75 He
continues:
By contrast, the Fourth Amendment’s No-Application
Understandings have been systematically forgotten.
For example, as Akhil Amar has emphasized, one of
the most important original understandings of the
Fourth Amendment was that it did not generally
prohibit warrantless searches or seizures. The
Amendment was intended to limit the issuance of
warrants, which were viewed with suspicion because
they immunized searches and seizures from
subsequent attack in court. . . . Today, [this] NoApplication Understanding has been jettisoned.
Modern Fourth Amendment doctrine holds that
warrantless
searches
are
presumptively
unconstitutional . . . .76
Case law on self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment
has followed a similar pattern. The detail of the original
understanding is obscure and unknown, and “all we know with
certainty about the historical meaning of the privilege is its
foundational paradigm case: the practice of interrogating an
accused under oath while threatening harsh sanctions against him
for refusal to answer.”77
There are problems, however, in applying the abhorrence of
74

Id.
RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 33.
76
Id. at 33. Professor Donald Dripps provides a telling critique, not of
Amar’s central conclusion regarding the importance of the general warrant,
but of the complexity of how to interpret that history in the light of changed
circumstance of the Fourteenth Amendment that applied the right to the
states, and the failure of tort remedies in this new environment. See Donald
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I
Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996).
77
RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 33.
75
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the core concern represented by the historical practice of
“‘subjecting those charged with crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt’ that defined the operation
of the Star Chamber.”78 To control custodial police
interrogation, modern self-incrimination doctrine must leap over
some substantial historical barriers. The suspect arrested and
interrogated by the police would not have been viewed as
“remotely comparable to the Star Chamber scenario” where the
oath was considered critical because he faced eternal damnation
if he perjured himself.79 Indeed, the historical evidence indicates
that questioning not done under oath was not prohibited by the
privilege against self-incrimination.80 Professor Yale Kamisar
notes a further problem. The arrested and interrogated suspect is
not under compulsion in a form historically recognized, which
was understood to be legal compulsion, since “he was
threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely nor
contempt for refusing to testify at all.”81 Thus, the interrogation
situation is a No-Application Understanding, but Miranda82
nonetheless rests on the Fifth Amendment.83
Another example of the expansion of rights in modern
constitutional criminal procedure contrary to historical
understandings in the Sixth Amendment itself is the right to
counsel discussed in Johnson v. Zerbst84 and Gideon v.
Wainwright.85 To modern lawyers, the pattern of the right to
counsel in England prior to the middle of the nineteenth century,
from which the United States departed, is positively bizarre.
78

Id. at 34 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990)).
Id. at 34-35.
80
See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1079-80 n.142
(1994).
81
YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION 37 (1980).
82
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83
Id. at 458 (claiming an “intimate connection between the [Fifth
Amendment’s] privilege against compulsory and police custodial questing,”
upon which the Miranda remedy rests).
84
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
85
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
79
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In ordinary criminal cases, the right to counsel was restricted
to the right of an individual, not to be appointed counsel, but to
be represented by retained counsel of his choice.86 However,
even that limited right was seemingly turned on its head as
compared to our conception, which grants counsel in serious
cases rather than minor cases. In contrast, English practice only
clearly allowed a defendant to be represented by retained
counsel in misdemeanor cases, while in felony cases, most of
which were at least nominally capital cases, the defendant was
prohibited from retaining counsel.87 The difficulty of defending
this position, which was based on the theory that the court was a
neutral in criminal trials where charges were generally brought
by private individuals, led to judicial exceptions such as the
right of counsel to argue legal points and frequently to take
other actions as well.88
The specific history of the right to counsel in the framing
process is extremely limited and not terribly helpful. What does
seem clear is that the constitutional provision was intended to
give defendants the right to bring their retained counsel into
court to represent them in all federal criminal cases.89 In United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,90 Justice Scalia stated that the “right
to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the
root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”91 He contrasts this
86

See generally WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 8-9 (1955). The exception was the right to two appointed
counsel in cases of treason, which was granted through legislation in 1695.
Id. at 9.
87
Id. at 8-9.
88
Id. at 9-11 (noting that, although practices differed between individual
cases, defense counsel was permitted to perform an increasing number of
functions during the eighteenth century, which sometimes included direct and
cross-examination, but was consistently barred from addressing the jury at the
conclusion of the evidence).
89
Id. at 32 (stating that “[t]he constitutional provision meant, at a
minimum, that defendants in federal courts had the right to retain their own
counsel”).
90
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
91
Id. at 2563. In support of this proposition, which seems clearly
correct, he cites Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Andersen
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core meaning from other aspects of the right that are “derived
from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial.”92
Earlier in that opinion, Scalia first articulated and then
rejected the distinction between the core right and the right
based on fairness of the trial in a way that reflects his view of
the Confrontation Clause. He acknowledged the government’s
point that the rights within the Sixth Amendment have the
purpose of ensuring a fair trial, but rejected any implication that
specific guarantees could be disregarded if the trial was fair on
the whole. He stated his point as follows:
What the Government urges upon us here is what was
urged upon us (successfully, at one time . . .) with
regard to the Sixth Amendment’s right of
confrontation—a line of reasoning that “abstracts
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the
right.” Since, it was argued, the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause was to ensure reliability of
evidence, so long as the testimony hearsay bore
“indicia of reliability,” the Confrontation Clause was
not violated.93
Something on the order of the confrontation right as
recognized in Crawford as part of the core meaning of the
Confrontation Clause, and in Professor Rubenfeld’s terminology,
it is an Application Understanding entitled to recognition as a
paradigm case. In contrast to Rubenfeld’s observation that with
rare exceptions Supreme Court decisions have honored
Application Understandings, the Court initially got this one
wrong. While I am not yet convinced that either the paradigm
case is accurately covered as a testimonial statement,94 or that if
v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898), makes a general reference to BEANEY, supra
note, at 18-24, 27-33, and a “cf” citation to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932).
92
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563.
93
Id. at 2562 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
94
I have argued elsewhere that the concept of “accusatory” statements
has some historical basis and either as a supplement or an alternative would
be useful in defining statements within the core area of concern of the
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covered the nomenclature of “testimonial” is accurately
descriptive,95 Crawford makes an important correction in giving
vigor to the confrontation right as a procedural right when core
values are concerned. Scalia’s point quoted above is thus largely
accurate and quite telling. The core procedural right was
abstracted to a principle of fairness–here reliability–and in that
amorphous form, it was ineffective in providing protection even
to core cases.
Having corrected the paradigm case does not at all mean,
however, that abstracting the right as part of an extension to
Confrontation Clause. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 16-17, 747-49.
However, if the Davis opinion is a guide, the Court seems uninterested in
using such terminology to describe the invigorated core of confrontation
despite being given substantial opportunity to do so. The brief for Petitioner
Hammon contained some version of “accuse” or “accusation” over one
hundred times; the brief for Petitioner Davis presented this terminology over
seventy times. Brief for Petitioner in Davis v. Washington, No. 05-5224;
Brief for Petitioner in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 055705. And the concept I
have advocated regarding accusatory statements to police officers was
specifically presented by Professor Friedman in oral argument as Hammon’s
counsel. Transcript of Oral Argument in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705,
at 27 (March 20, 2006). However, Justice Scalia did not embrace either the
limited version regarding police officers or more generally ascribe utility to
accusatory statements in describing or defining the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. His opinion in Davis did not use the terms “accusatorial,”
“accusatory,” or “accusation” a single time, Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-81,
and Justice Thomas uses “accusers” only to describe the historical practices
under the Marian Statutes, where that category of individuals had special
place. Id. at 2281, 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95
As the definition of “testimonial” statements was further developed in
Davis it appears to me more sensible, but less “testimonial.” Scalia moves
the focus of whose perspective matters from that of the speaker to that of the
questioner, and he diminishes the importance of the formality of the
statement. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 7-9. It appears sufficient that the
statement be secured in a non-emergency situation by a known investigative
officer for the purpose of establishing a past fact. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278,
n.5. That is quite far from what “testimonial” would appear to convey and,
as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, not what was indicated by the initial
statement of the concept in White v. Illinois. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2282-83
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing his definition of “testimonial” in White, 502
U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). The current form is, I believe,
superior, but it would likely be better described by other terminology.
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cover No-Application Understandings is wrong. That is in
essence what the Court did in Johnson v. Zerbst and Gideon v.
Wainwright under the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.
First, in Johnson, the court interpreted the Sixth
Amendment, not historically, but as a guarantee of fairness.96
Then, in Gideon, through the language of fundamental rights
essential to a fair trial, the Court declared that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the right to appointment of
counsel in the states as to all felonies because such a right was
essential to a fair trial.97
96

The Court in declaring the defendant to have been denied his Sixth
Amendment right when not offered appointed counsel stated:
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not “still
be done.” It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is
simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer—to the untrained
layman—may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious.
Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and
other parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to
“. . . the humane policy of the modern criminal law . . .” which
now provides that a defendant “. . . if he be poor, . . . may
have counsel furnished him by the state, . . . not
infrequently . . . more able than the attorney for the state.”
304 U.S. at 462-63. The language is of fairness in a modern age.
97
Justice Black stated:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him. A defendant’s need for a lawyer is
nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice
Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: “The right to be heard would
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
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It is hardly irrational to derive from the Confrontation
Clause’s procedural guarantee that defendants may test witness’
testimony, whose purpose is to ensure fairness and reliability,
the principle that the confrontation right is concerned with
ensuring reliability or trustworthiness in evidence. Outside the
core area of protection, a guarantee that helps force
confrontation or excludes particularly problematic hearsay
statements from a person whom the defendant cannot confront is
well in line with the additional types of protections guaranteed in
other areas of constitutional criminal procedure. It cannot be
said that such a right is historically grounded, but as noted
above, such extrapolation from the historical core is in good
company. Moreover, such protection does not threaten in any
fashion the core procedural right Crawford guarantees.
III. AMBIGUITY IN THE MAJOR HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT TO THE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT
The treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh is cited by Justice
Scalia as one of the major historical events that was known to
the Framers and that influenced their fashioning of the
Confrontation Clause.98 In telling of this event, Scalia
emphasizes the admission of certain hearsay that fits his
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence.”
372 U.S. at 344-45 (citing 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). Again, this is
language of fairness.
98
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 50.
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testimonial model. However, other hearsay was also admitted
against Raleigh, which is almost certainly nontestimonial. That
latter hearsay, which could suggest a broader confrontation
right, is omitted. Scalia’s very narrow, clear, and definitive
account of the story amounts to a selective recitation that
arguably produces an erroneously narrow confrontation doctrine.
In the Raleigh story, there are “testimonial statements,” as
Scalia characterizes them, that might well have concerned the
Framers. Scalia cites the use of a letter by Lord Cobham as
proof not only of the Framers’ concern, but also of the specific
construction that should be given to the Confrontation Clause.
On the question of whether interrogation is required, he states in
Davis with apparent total confidence based on the use of this
letter that the “Framers were no more willing to exempt from
cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to openended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed
interrogation.”99 This assertion reflects remarkable certainty and
selectivity.
On the other hand, Raleigh protested the admission of other
hearsay, which appears almost certainly not to be testimonial
under Scalia’s construction of the term, but it is unnoticed and
unmentioned in the historical accounts in both Crawford and
Davis. It is difficult to understand the origin of this certainty that
the Framers were not concerned about that other, arguably even
more outrageous, hearsay. The omitted part of the Raleigh story
challenges the clarity of Scalia’s version of history and his
confident assertions that the Framers had only a core
constitutional concern with regard to testimonial statements.100
The other hearsay also illustrates a further ambiguity, which
is the subject of the next section. It involves the “translation” of
history into its contemporary constitutional meaning and the
99

126 S. Ct. 2274 at n.1.
If the core constitutional concern were not only with the narrow class
of testimonial statements necessarily defined by Crawford (i.e.. “prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
and to police interrogations,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68), but defined the
core to include “accusatory” statements as well, both types of complaints in
the Raleigh story would fit.
100
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interaction between the development and understanding of
hearsay law at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights as
compared to its definition and admissibility today. It also
explores how those differences would have impacted the
Framers’ intentions for the Clause and how the earlier different
treatment of hearsay should affect our interpretation of the role
of historical meaning as applied to an altered, modern setting.
Scalia concentrates on Lord Cobham, who gave several
statements to members of the Privy Council and who wrote two
incriminating letters to the Council regarding the case. Raleigh
insisted on, but was denied, the right to confront Cobham.
Scalia focuses exclusively on this aspect of the story.
There was a witness produced against Raleigh, one Dyer,
who did not provide his own firsthand accusations against
Raleigh but rather recounted the accusations of another person,
who was not identified by name and did not testify. Dyer, a ship
pilot who had been in Lisbon, Portugal during the time of the
alleged conspiracy to topple the king, testified:
Being at Lisbon, there came to me a Portugal
gentlemen who asked me how the King of England
did, and whether he was crowned? I answered him
that I hoped our noble King was well and crowned by
this, but the time was not come when I came from
the coast for Spain. “Nay,” said he, “your King shall
never be crowned, for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh
will cut his throat before he come to be crowned.”
Sir W. Raleigh: This is the saying of some wild
Jesuit or beggarly Priest; but what proof is it against
me?
Attorney General [Sir Edward Coke]: It must per
force arise out of some preceding intelligence, and
shows that your treason had wings.
Sir W. Raleigh: If Cobham did practise with
Aremberg, how could it but be known in Spain? Why
did they name the Duke of Buckingham in Jack
Straw’s Rebellion, and the Duke of York in Jack
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Cade’s, but to give countenance to the treasons?101
Professor Myrna Raeder has noted the significance of this
statement. She argues that, in terms of the historical record,
both Cobham’s hearsay and that of the Portuguese gentlemen
were received in Raleigh’s trial, and asks why we should not be
then concerned with both.102 She assumes, correctly in my
judgment, that the second type of hearsay might not be covered
by the testimonial concept since it was “made to a private
individual, but was clearly accusatory, either from the
perspective of the declarant or a reasonable observer.”103
Writing long before Crawford was decided, Professor Roger
Park noted that, even if the Raleigh trial had a major impact on
the Framers, it is ambiguous in providing guidance on the scope
of the Confrontation Clause. If intended to prohibit the conduct
in Raleigh’s trial, the accusations of Cobham should not be
admitted. Professor Park suggests “that anonymous rumors from
101

JARDINE, supra note 15, at 436. The testimony is recited with slight
differences in Howell’s State Trials. The exchange is given as follows:
Dyer: I came to a merchant’s house in Lisbon, to see a boy
that I had there; there came a gentleman into the house, and
enquiring what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman.
Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I
answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly. Nay,
saith he, he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don
Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come.
Raleigh: What infer you upon this?
Att: That your treason had wings.
Raleigh: If Cobham did practise with Aremberg, how could
it not but be known in Spain? Why did they name the duke of
Buckingham with Jack Straw’s Treason, and the duke of York
with Jack Cade, but that it was to countenance his Treason?
Consider, you Gentlemen of the Jury, there is no cause so
doubtful which the king’s counsel cannot make good against the
law. Consider my disability, and their ability: they prove
nothing against me, only they bring the Accusation of my Lord
Cobham, which he has lamented . . . .
2 STATE TRIALS 25 (T.B. Howell ed., T.C. Hansard 1816).
102
Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 318 (2005).
103
Id. at 319.
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declarants without personal knowledge should be excluded as
well.”104
Raleigh was not a lawyer and was not permitted to have an
attorney in his treason trial. Thus, it is unfair to hold him to the
legal knowledge of the time, particularly in responding
immediately to the accusation from Dyer, which he likely did
not know would be produced. However, several scholars have
interpreted Raleigh’s response as an objection not to the lack of
confrontation but rather, at least initially, to the insignificance of
the statement. Professor Kenneth Graham sees Raleigh’s
response as going to “weight rather than admissibility,”105 and
Professor Robert Pitler notes the lack of complaint about
confrontation, which he suggests alternatively might have been
due to the fact that Raleigh was arguing instead the absence of
probative value, or because he may have sensed the testimonial
statement distinction—a difference between a private person’s
statement and “government secured, ex-parte examined
statements.”106
One may reasonably argue that Dyer’s hearsay has limited
importance because the evidence is weak. Indeed, in Raleigh’s
initial summation to the jury, he stated that “[f]or all that is said
to the contrary, you see my only accuser is the Lord
Cobham . . . .”107 However, Professor Graham notes that
104

Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 51, 90 (1987).
105
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99,
101 (1972).
106
Robert M. Pitler, Introduction, 71 BROOK L. REV. 1, 8n.28 (2005). I
take modest issues with one of Professor Pitler’s suggestions, or at least do
so from the perspective of those who are firmly convinced Scalia is
recounting a view of the Clause clearly known to the Framers and their
progenitors. Professor Pitler suggests that noting this distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements would have been “prescient.”
Those who claim the distinction to be the clear interpretation of what I
believe is a murky historical record would say, I believe, that Raleigh was
merely observing that distinction, which was obvious to those in Raleigh’s
time and as to the Framers, and to us now after Crawford.
107
JARDINE, supra note 15, at 441.
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despite the fact that his contemporaries thought none of the
evidence proved Raleigh’s guilt, he was still convicted.108 The
fact that he was convicted on what is argued to be inadequate
evidence does not inspire confidence that this hearsay was in
fact insignificant evidence. Some commentators have observed
that this was the corroborating evidence that the prosecutor, Sir
Edward Coke, offered in response to Raleigh’s protestations that
if Lord Cobham were produced there would be no need for
corroboration.109
Given the concentration of attention on the accusation of
Lord Cobham both by Raleigh and by those who have
commented on the case, I accept that Cobham’s statements were
likely the central concern of those troubled by the lack of
confrontation in Raleigh’s case. Dyer’s recitation of the
accusations of the Portugese gentleman was, however, also there
as part of the historical record, and no commentator has
demonstrated that it was not also of concern to the Framers.
As Raleigh’s biographer observed, the introduction of Dyer’s
hearsay was “the crowning absurdity” of the trial.110 Justice
Scalia’s omission of it from the historical account is surely a
selective analysis of that history, which carries with it obvious
dangers of misunderstanding of and lack of appreciation for the
108

Graham, supra note 105, at 101.
Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring Foundation Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation
Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 149 (1995). See also Stephan Landsman, Who
Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 646 (1992).
110
WILLARD M. WALLACE, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 210 (1959). See also
30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE—HEARSAY AND
CONFRONTATION § 6342, at 268 n.610 (1997) (noting both the weakness of
the evidence as hearsay evidence in the form of an opinion from a person
who could not have had personal knowledge, but also recognizing that it was
cited as absurd in Raleigh’s biography). Wallace stated further: “The case
against Raleigh was falling of its own flimsiness when the prosecution
attached significance to such evidence.” WALLACE, supra note 110, at 210.
But again there is discord between the position that the case was falling apart
and the fact that Raleigh was convicted, and the real possibility that evidence
mattered to the conviction.
109
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full range of the Framers’ concerns.
IV. APPLICATION OF ORIGINALISM IN A CHANGED WORLD: THE
PROBLEM OF KNOWING AND TRANSLATING
In his concurrence and dissent in Crawford, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited an aspect of an article that I had written in
support of his argument that it is difficult to apply the historical
understanding regarding confrontation from a world with a very
different treatment of hearsay to the modern day.111 Rehnquist
was arguing that unsworn statements made to police officers,
such as those offered in Crawford, would not have been
admitted in evidence at the time of the framing because they
were not made under oath, a safeguard the absence of which
bars admission of the hearsay as well as the additional
consideration of it under the right of confrontation.112
Rehnquist argued that any classification of particularly
suspect statements beyond that of sworn affidavits and
depositions, such as Scalia makes, is somewhat arbitrary since
unsworn statements were treated no differently than
nontestimonial statements, and there was no special concern with
a broad category of testimonial but unsworn statements.113 He
objected to this “mere proxy for what the Framers might have
intended had such evidence been liberally admitted as
substantive evidence like it is today.”114 Scalia responded:
Any attempt to determine the application of a
constitutional provision to a phenomenon that did not
exist at the time of its adoption
(here,
allegedly,
admissible unsworn testimony) involves some degree
of estimation—what the Chief Justice calls use of a
“proxy,” . . . but that is hardly a reason not to make
111

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting from analysis). The article is Remaking
Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, supra note 43, at 738-46.
112
Id. at 70-71.
113
Id. at 71.
114
Id.
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the estimation as accurate as possible. Even if, as The
Chief Justice mistakenly asserts, there was no direct
evidence of how the Sixth Amendment originally
applied to unsworn testimony, there is no doubt what
its application would have been.115
Later in Davis, Scalia made a similar point in rejecting
Justice Thomas’ argument that the statement to a police officer
in the field was not sufficiently formal, unlike the depositions
taken by Marian magistrates, which were characterized by a
high degree of formality. Scalia stated, “restricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”116
Rehnquist uses the term “proxy.” Scalia speaks of
“estimation.” Still others term this process “translation.”117
Regardless of the label, this is the process by which the original
purpose is effectuated in a changed and changing world.118 As
Scalia’s use of it indicates, it is a tool that at least modestly
flexible originalists can use.119
This process, which I will call translation, is obviously
necessary unless the Constitution is to become irrelevant to
modern life. It is, nonetheless, fraught with great difficulty and
uncertainty unless one has the ability to “channel” the
Framers.120 With respect to confrontation, one must first
115

Id. at 52 n.3.
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5.
117
See Lessig, supra note 62.
118
RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 9.
119
See also Lessig, supra note 62, at 1167-68 (discussing “translation”
as a tool of originalist interpretation).
120
Although such translation is, I believe, almost always difficult, it is
particularly difficult in some situations where the world is so different that it
is virtually impossible to imagine what the Framers would have thought of
the new environment. The Fourth Amendment appears to be one of those
almost impossible situations, although creative authors can and do draw
interesting insights that they present with an enormous number of caveats.
See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel,
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites
the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451 (2005).
116
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determine what the law of confrontation was at the time of the
framing, which can be complicated by its interaction with
hearsay restrictions. Then, one must determine what the Framers
knew about the law,121 and ascertain how the provision adopted
was designed to remedy whatever problem was perceived.
Finally, moving to the process of translation, one needs to
determine how best to effectuate the Framers’ intentions in a
changed context.
I contend that the difficulty of knowing for certain how this
translation should operate is another reason why Roberts should
have been permitted to operate outside the core area of concern.
The Court may well have picked a slightly inaccurate tool—the
testimonial statement concept—to effectuate the intent of the
Framers, running the risk that in the process of giving a detailed
definition to the term it may make mistakes of translation.
The Court has twice refused to give a comprehensive
definition of testimonial statements. If history and translation
offered a clear definition, surely the Court would have set out
that rule. But obviously an enormous number of legitimate
questions are not answered and if honestly treated cannot be
definitively decided.
For example, we do not yet know if the government must
have a role in creating the statement, and if it does, whether the
speaker must know he or she is talking to a government agent.
We do not yet know whether the intention involved must be
121

Professor Davies argues, (1) that much of what Justice Scalia says
about the law at the time the Confrontation Clause was proposed and adopted
is in error, and (2) that particularly as to what the English law that Scalia
cites was at the critical time, the Framers would have had great difficulty
knowing it. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know,
and When Did they Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). See also generally Thomas Y.
Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the Framing Era Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of
the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007).
Whether one accepts each of the points that Davies makes or not, the
accumulation of evidence that he provides for inaccuracy in understanding the
law from a different era and the difficulty of attributing questionable
knowledge to the Framers is to my examination extremely persuasive.
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viewed from the perspective of the speaker or of the government
agent. We do not yet know what type of formality is required.
The list of unknowns is not unlimited, but it is lengthy and
includes many questions of substantial importance. While history
gives us clues as to these answers, it yields very few certainties.
Moreover, even as to statements that are not testimonial, it is
unclear how the Framers would have reacted to a modern world
where, as Rehnquist noted, hearsay is much more admissible
and ordinarily given weight that likely would have appeared
foreign to the Framers.122 For example, in Crawford, Scalia
states that the spontaneous declaration exception was much
narrower at the time of the framing than it is today.123
The Framers therefore could not have contemplated whether
the Confrontation Clause should apply to the vast range of
excited utterances that are today introduced with great frequency
and with apparently persuasive impact because most of those
statements would have been inadmissible in the Framers’ world
on hearsay grounds. The Court suggested that the spontaneous
declaration made to a police officer in White v. Illinois124 might
be excluded as a testimonial statement,125 but would the Framers
have excluded such statements made to family members as well?
We cannot know because it is unclear that the law permitted
admission of either at the time of the framing.
Therefore, we may only make a realistic and appropriately
modest claim about our ability to know what information was
available to the Framers, their understanding of it, and their
intentions, and then attempt to translate and properly apply such
122

Rehnquist contended that, although courts were inconsistent, “out-ofcourt statements made by someone other than the accused and not taken
under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not
considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting from the analysis).
123
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (stating that to be admissible the
statement needed to be “immediat[ely] upon the hurt received,” (quoting
Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693)).
124
502 U.S. at 349-51.
125
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
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understandings to modern practices. These limitations call for a
weaker additional system, such as that set forth in Roberts, to
screen problematic hearsay. The statement may be regarded as
suspect either because it is facially unreliable or because it is
only barely outside the definition of testimonial statements, and
in either situation, the defendant lacked the procedural protection
of an opportunity to confront the witness against him.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts approach, as developed and weakened by later
Supreme Court decisions, provided incomplete protection of the
confrontation right. However, as to the troubling hearsay
presented in Wright,126 it proved adequate to exclude the
hearsay. As noted earlier, where the Framers established a
procedural protection to help ensure the reliability of evidence
by face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination, it is hardly
ridiculous to have a residual protection where face-to-face
confrontation and cross-examination are not afforded to test
facially unreliable statements (the functional equivalent of a
witness) admitted against the accused. Crawford was right to
note that judges were not to be entrusted with admitting the most
historical suspect statements simply because the judge believed
the statement to be reliable. The Framers feared judges could
not be broadly trusted to protect individual rights,127 and
126

The hearsay involved accusatory statements by a young child solicited
by a pediatrician using suggestive questions. Id. at 826. Wright does not
stand alone. One area where Roberts has been used reasonably frequently to
exclude problematic hearsay involves statements of children in sexual abuse
cases. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 84-85 (Winter 2002)
(examining treatment of federal circuits under Roberts in child sexual abuse
cases and noting Eighth Circuit’s particular concern where no treatment
interest is shown by the child).
127
The Court described the Framers’ distrust of judges as follows:
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost
good faith when they found reliability. The Framers, however,
would not have been content to indulge this assumption. They
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therefore it was theoretically and factually correct to fear that
judges would do a poor job in providing protection through their
ad hoc approach to reliability. However, charging judges with
the duty to exclude particularly unreliable hearsay that has not
been confronted as supplemental protection was no more
prohibited by the Framers than Miranda. Roberts did nothing to
harm the core protection that Crawford and Davis describe and
begin to define.
Roberts is gone, and with it almost certainly, is Wright.
They were, however, in good company with other aspects of
contemporary constitutional criminal procedure that, although
inconsistent with originalist analysis, remain valid doctrine.
Roberts and Wright should have been permitted to continue to
“live” within the federal Confrontation Clause and to provide
their modest but important supplemental protection. Perhaps
some part of their sound functional concept that highly
problematic hearsay should be subject either to confrontation or
to an examination as to reliability will find a home elsewhere.
Unfortunately, the protection of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment is to be determined solely by interpretation of
the word “testimonial.”

knew that judges, like other government officers, could not
always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people; the likes
of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory.
They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial
hands. . . . By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees
with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.
Vague standards are manipulable, and, while that might be a
small concern in run-of-the-mill assault prosecutions like this
one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases
like Raleigh’s⎯great state trials where the impartiality of even
those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not be so clear.
It is difficult to imagine Roberts’ providing any meaningful
protection in those circumstances.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68.

